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By analogy to classical cryptography, we develop a ”quantum public key” based cryptographic
scheme in which the two public and private keys consist in each of two entangled beams of squeezed
light. An analog message is encrypted by modulating the phase of the beam sent in public. The
knowledge of the degree of non classical correlation between the beam quadratures measured in
private and in public allows only the receiver to decrypt the message. Finally, in a view towards
absolute security, we formally prove that any external intervention of an eavesdropper makes him
vulnerable to any subsequent detection.
PACS numbers: 3.67.Dd, 3.67.Hk, 42.50, 42.65.-k
Quantum correlations (entanglement) between light
beams is a subject of considerable activity leading to
novel applications such as quantum cryptography, quan-
tum computation and quantum teleportation. As an al-
ternative to classical cryptography, quantum cryptogra-
phy methods based on correlation of a single photon pair
[1] have been widely studied over the past years. They
have lead to protocoles permitting to transmit confiden-
tial messages safely [2, 3, 4]. On the other hand, few
results have been presented for systems with a large num-
ber of photons such as correlated quadratures [5, 6, 7].
The use of intense photons beams could present numer-
ous technological avantages in comparison to the use of
single photons pulses. Photon counting detectors are
much more efficient to detect squeezed light [5] and its
transmission through an optical fiber can be done over a
much longer distance [7].
In particular, Pereira et al. [8] have proposed a scheme
in which a coherent light beam containing the message is
transmitted through an adequate superimposition with
two entangled beams of squeezed light. Since each of the
two entangled beams is a noisy channel, they need to
be recombined in order to decrypt the message. In this
approach, the noise is used to hide the message which
becomes thus unreadable during the transmission.
Based on similar considerations, we aim at developping
a “quantum public key” based cryptographic scheme.
The public key method [1, 9] is widely used nowadays
in classical cryptography. It consists in two keys. The
first key is public and known to everybody i.e. to the
sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) of the message and
a possible undesirable third party. On the contrary, the
second key is private and known only by the receiver of
the message. The procedure is the following: Bob sends
the public key to Alice who uses it to encrypt the mes-
sage; then Alice sends back the encrypted information to
Bob who is the only one able to decrypt it thanks to the
private key. In this scheme, the essential idea is that the
encryption is public in the sense that anyone, including
a third party, can encrypt a message but any decryp-
tion process must require necessarily the knowledge of
the second key. In this manner, messages are transmit-
ted through public channel with strict confidentiality.
In this letter, we investigate theoretically a quantum
public key scheme similar to the classical one. We de-
vice a scheme in which the “q-private” and “q-public”
keys consist in each of the two entangled photon beams
respectively. We analyse a process to encrypt an analog
message using the “q-public” light beam. The confiden-
tiality of the message is guaranteed since the second “q-
private” light beam is needed for the decryption process.
The prefix “q-” has been added to remind the quantum
character of the signal produced which, to the contrary of
a classical signal, cannot be necessarily reproduced. The
non-cloning theorem indeed prevents making an exact
copy of an unknown quantum signal. Thus, the q-public
beam is accessible only to any first user including a third
party.
The non-cloning theorem is also the basic idea from
which one can prove that the transmission is secure
against an eavesdropper (Eve) [2, 3, 4]. The impossi-
bility of reproduction prevents Eve from having access to
any quantum state without modifying it. Such a mod-
ification makes her vulnerable to any subsequent detec-
tion by the sender and/or the receiver. As far as secu-
rity is concerned, we formally prove for the first time, to
our knowledge, the vulnerability of an eavesdropper to
any external intervention during a communication pro-
cess using continuous variables. However, we point out
that this result does not imply the absolute security of
the transmission since the vulnerability of Eve does not
mean that she will be necessarily detected. An appro-
priated protocol of communication is required to detect
that eavesdropping has occured. This essential issue is
not completely discussed in this letter and remains still
open in the case of continuous variables.
Let us start with the description of the quantum public
key based scheme. Suppose that Alice wishes to send a
message to Bob. To this purpose, Bob produces an EPR
state consisting of two entangled beams characterized by
the photon annihilation operators aˆ1 and aˆ2 [13]. Written
in occupation photon number representation, this state
2has the form:
|Ψ〉 = exp
(
raˆ†1aˆ
†
2 − raˆ1aˆ2
)
|0〉1|0〉2 =
∞∑
n=0
cn|n〉1|n〉2 (1)
where cn = (tanh r)
n/ cosh r and r is the squeezing real
parameter. Bob then sends beam 1 to Alice and keeps
beam 2 in his laboratory. Since Bob has access to the
beam 2, he is the only one able to carry out any mea-
surement on the total wave function (1). Alice or Eve,
however, is restricted to carry out a measurement of any
observable concerning the subsystem of the beam 1. All
the information available to them is extracted only from
the diagonal density matrix resulting from the partial
trace of the total wave function over the unknown beam
2:
ρˆ1 = Tr2(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) =
∞∑
n=0
|cn|
2|n〉1 1〈n| (2)
With the “q-public” beam received from Bob, Alice en-
crypts the secret message by making a unitary transfor-
mation Mˆ which modifies the total wave function but not
the density matrix. Consequently, Mˆ should verify the
following criteria:
Mˆ |Ψ〉 6= |Ψ〉 (3)
Mˆ ρˆ1Mˆ
† = ρˆ1 (4)
Then Alice sends the beam 1 back to Bob which, thanks
to the second “q-private” beam is the only one to decrypt
the message. Another alternative is that Alice carries out
some measurement herself on the beam 1 and sends the
results to Bob through a public classical channel. The use
of such a classical public channel avoids the blockability
of the system by Eve and thus is secure against a split-
universe attack [10]. Since the density matrix has not
been alterated in the encryption process, one does not
observe the presence of the message in the signal received
by Bob.
Among the many existing possibilities, the phase trans-
formation:
Mˆ = exp
(
if(aˆ†1aˆ1)
)
(5)
satisfies both criteria (3) and (4). f(x) could be any
real function. For convenience, we choose a simple lin-
ear function f(x) = θx which transforms the coefficients
cn → exp(iθn)cn. The constant θ is the analog quantity
containing the message that Alice encrypts. In compar-
ison with [8], in our encryption process, the message is
really “invisible” in the signal and thus cannot be distin-
guished from the noise.
After the phase transformation, the field operator as-
sociated to the first beam becomes aˆ1′ = Mˆ aˆ1Mˆ
† =
exp(−iθ)aˆ1. An efficient way to decrypt the informa-
tion is to measure observables for which the EPR state
is an eigenstate. Because of the difficulty to get access to
some of them in experiment, one uses rather the quadra-
ture components operators:
Zˆ1′ = aˆ1′e
−iφA + aˆ†
1′
eiφA = e−iθA aˆ1 + e
iθA aˆ†1 (6)
Zˆ2 = e
−iθB aˆ2 + e
iθB aˆ†2 , (7)
where θA = φA+θ. φA and θB are the phases of the local
oscillators used by Alice and Bob, respectively, in their
homodyne measurements and determine which quadra-
ture they select for their measurements. θB must remain
private to Bob whereas φA must be communicated in
public to Bob at some stage of the protocol.
Although the EPR state is not an eigenstate of these
operators, the uncertainty in the quadrature difference
Zˆ− = Zˆ1′−Zˆ2 is close to zero as the squeezing parameter
r becomes large and θA+θB = 0. We notice indeed from
the expression (1) that:
〈Ψ|δ2Zˆ−|Ψ〉 = 2 [cosh 2r − cos(θA + θB) sinh 2r](8)
r>>1
→ 4 sinh 2r sin2
(θA + θB)
2
(9)
On the other hand, the introduction of non opposite
phases θA + θB 6= 0 generates for large r a quantum un-
certainty which appears under the form of fluctuations
during the measurement of the quadrature difference. In
this manner, the message is obtained by determining the
intensity of the noise resulting from these fluctuations
[13].
Fig.1 depicts a possible setup. The two EPR “q-
private” and “q-public” beams are generated through
a nondegenerate parametric down conversion process.
They result from the fluorescence of a pump beam pass-
ing through a type II crystal acting also as an optical
parametric amplifier (OPA) [8, 11, 12, 13]. The quadra-
tures components are measured in a homodyne detection
with the help of local oscillators fields (LO). The pump
field, which generates the two EPR beams via parametric
down conversion, is obtained by one intermediate second
harmonic (SHG) step as usually. While Bob carries out
the homodyne detection of one quadrature of beam 2 for
phase θB, Alice encrypts the message θ by modulating
the beam 1 phase (e.g. by means of an electro-optical
modulator), before carrying out the measurement of the
quadrature φA. Finally, Alice sends back to Bob the re-
sults of her measurement through a public classical chan-
nel.
Let us now discuss the matter of the vulnerability of
Eve to any subsequent detection by Alice and/or Bob.
Let Zˆ1′ and Zˆ2 be the observables measured by Alice
and Bob respectively. Suppose that Eve tries to have
access to the “q-public” beam 1 and thus modifies it by
means of an unitary transformation:
aˆ1E = Uˆ
†aˆ1Uˆ (10)
3The unitary operator Uˆ could depend on other external
degrees of freedom (observables) introduced by Eve. For
example, Eve could use another photon beam or other
modes of the same beam but taken at a different time or
even a detector in view of a measurement on the beam
1. We denote by |ν〉 a basis of the Hilbert space char-
acterizing these external degrees of freedom and assume
that |0〉 is the initial state before the modification. Then
the state after the unitary transformation is Uˆ |Ψ〉|0〉. Let
us define the probability distribution to find the system
with the values z1 and z2 of the quadrature component
observables Zˆ1′ and Zˆ2:
P (z1′ , z2) = 〈Ψ|δ(z1′ − Zˆ1′)δ(z2 − Zˆ2)|Ψ〉 (11)
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FIG. 1: Schematic set-up for the “quantum public key” based
cryptography with continous variables
After Eve’s action the probability distribution becomes:
PE(z1′ , z2) = 〈0|〈Ψ|Uˆ
†δ(z1′ − Zˆ1′)δ(z2 − Zˆ2)Uˆ |Ψ〉|0〉
(12)
To avoid that Eve presence is revealed, both probability
distributions must be equal for the particular values of
θA and θB chosen by Alice and Bob. On the other hand,
Eve is vulnerable to detection, whenever there exist pos-
sible choices of θA, θB (possible homodyne measurements
made by Bob or Alice) for which the probability distri-
bution of the measurement outcomes is changed by Eve’s
action.
THEOREM : If Alice measures only one quadrature
Zˆ1′ , Eve attack is not vulnerable to a successive detection
by Bob if and only if 〈ν|Uˆ |0〉 is a function only of the
quadrature operator Zˆ1′ .
PROOF: When 〈ν|Uˆ |0〉 commutes with Zˆ1′ then the
Uˆ ’s cancel each other in (12) and trivially:
PE(z1′ , z2) = P (z1′ , z2) (13)
On the contrary, let us examine the consequence of re-
quiring (13) for all possible choices of the quadrature Zˆ2
measured by Bob but only for the state |Ψ〉 given by (1).
Taking the Fourier transform on z1 and z2, the equation
(13) becomes:
〈0|〈Ψ|Uˆ †eiZˆ1′s1eiZˆ2s2 Uˆ |Ψ〉|0〉 = 〈Ψ|eiZˆ1′s1eiZˆ2s2 |Ψ〉
(14)
This equality should be satisfied for any value of the real
parameters s1, s2, θB. The last two can be replaced
by the more global complex parameter ξ = ξX + iξY =
eiθBs2, in such a way that Zˆ2s2 = ξaˆ
†
2 + ξ
⋆aˆ2. Let us
introduce:
Tn,n′(ξ, ξ
∗) = 2〈n
′|e−i(ξaˆ
†
2
+ξ⋆aˆ2)|n〉2 (15)
A calculation shows that for all occupation number n and
n′ of the beam 2:
∫
d2ξ
pi
Tn,n′(ξ, ξ
∗)ei(ξaˆ
†
2
+ξ⋆aˆ2) = |n〉2 2〈n
′| (16)
Applying this transformation to (14) and using the prop-
erty of entanglement of (1), we eliminate the states de-
scribing the second beam since Uˆ does not affect beam 2.
We obtain for all occupation numbers n and n′ for beam
1:
〈0| 1〈n
′|Uˆ †eiZˆ1′s1 Uˆ |n〉1|0〉 = 1〈n
′|eiZˆ1′s1 |n〉1 (17)
4Operating the inverse transformation of the matrix ele-
ment in the right hand side, we get:
〈0| 1〈n
′|Uˆ †eiZˆ1′s1 Uˆe−iZˆ1′s1 |n〉1|0〉 = δn′,n (18)
Without loss of generality we can write the explicit de-
pendance of Uˆ on the observables associated to the first
beam as Uˆ = Uˆ(Zˆ1′ , Qˆ1′), where Qˆ1′ = (aˆ1e
−iθA −
aˆ†1e
iθA)/i is the observable canonically conjugated to Zˆ1′ .
Noticing that the exponential operator is the generator of
translations i.e. eiZˆ1′s1Qˆ1′e
−iZˆ
1′ s1 = Qˆ1′ − 2s1, Eq.(18)
becomes:
〈0| 1〈n
′|Uˆ †(Zˆ1′ , Qˆ1′)Uˆ(Zˆ1′ , Qˆ1′ − 2s1)|n〉1|0〉 = δn′,n
(19)
Because two normalized states with unity scalar product
are necessarily equal, we infer that for all n:
Uˆ(Zˆ1′ , Qˆ1′)|n〉1|0〉 = Uˆ(Zˆ1′ , Qˆ1′ − 2s1)|n〉1|0〉 (20)
We conclude that, for any state |ν〉, 〈ν|Uˆ(Zˆ1′ , Qˆ1′)|0〉
does not depend on Qˆ1′ or equivalently it depends only
on the quadrature operator Zˆ1′ measured by Alice.
COROLLARY: If Alice chooses to measure between
at least two distinct and non opposite quadratures, Eve
attack is not vulnerable if and only if Uˆ does not interact
with the beam 1 and acts only onto the state |0〉 i.e.:
〈ν| 1〈n
′|Uˆ |n〉1|0〉 = δn′,nuν (21)
where uν does not depend on n.
PROOF: From the theorem, we deduce that for each
non opposite quadrature we must have the dependance
Uˆ(Zˆ1′). Since the quadratures are independent, the only
possibility is that Uˆ is independent of any observable
relative to the beam 1 or is of the form (21).
One direct consequence of the theorem and its corol-
lary is that if there is any element of randomness in the
choice of the quadrature Zˆ1′ made by Alice, then Eve
cannot safely extract any information about beam 1 and
therefore about the message. This element of random-
ness can be introduced as a random choice between two
distinct and non opposite values φA. Alternatively the
message itself can be a random sequence of phase shifts
θ, chosen at least between two distinct and non opposite
values. Thus, Eve is also vulnerable in the case of a digi-
tal transmission in which for example, Alice restricts her
measurement to two orthogonal quadratures.
The facts that the probability distributions must be
equal for any value of θB, that the second beam has been
kept private and that |Ψ〉 has the entangled form (1)
permits to achieve the proofs. If the value of θB remains
fixed, the linear transformation cannot be carried out
since the integration in (16) must be done over all ξ.
If Eve has access to the second beam, then the unitary
operator depends also on aˆ2 and aˆ
†
2 and the passage from
(14) to (17) is not necessarily valid. Finally, if |Ψ〉 is
different and for example is a disentangled state, then
the beam 1 might be cloned by Eve and therefore she
can obtain information without being detected.
The vulnerability of Eve does not mean that she will be
necessarily detected by Bob. When Bob receives a mes-
sage, how can he know a priori that eavesdropping has
occured? For example, Eve can block Bob’s public beam
and can replace it with a public beam of her own. Alice
proceeds as planned and sends the results of her measure-
ment to both Bob and to Eve. Eve decrypts the correct
message but Bob gets the wrong message. To avoid this
situation, Bob must be able to check that some expected
correlations are recovered. One possibility is the intro-
duction of some redundancies in the message which can
help him to detect the presence of the third party. For
example, Alice sends twice portions of the message. Any
external intervention is detected if two identical portions
are not recovered. Therefore, a strategy of communi-
cation or protocol is needed in order to guarantee the
absolute security of the transmission. The study of such
protocols requires further investigation and is beyond the
scope of this letter.
In summary, we developed a “quantum public key”
scheme for encrypting a message by means of quantum
correlated beams. This scheme is based on the principle
that any decryption of the message requires both mea-
surements of a “q-private” key signal and an encrypted
“q-public” key signal. Directions for a future research
work include, in addition to the study of secure protocols,
the imperfection in the photon counting of the detector
and the possibility of loss in the transmission which de-
grades the correlations.
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